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 Abstract 
 
Social media platforms are increasingly being used for a variety of purposes in disaster pre-
paredness, response and relief work. In a growing number of cases, citizens use social media 
platforms to self-organize and carry out tasks in emergencies. During the 2013 floods in 
Dresden, Germany, several Facebook groups emerged as a primary medium for citizens to 
gather and share information about the emergency. Importantly, the Facebook groups became 
a way to organize response efforts on the ground. These networks functioned as ‘switch-
boards’ whereby citizens in need of help could be connected to those that offered it. The 
online activity moreover helped to amplify solidarity and social cohesion both towards flood 
victims, and among volunteers. The article provides an in-depth analysis of one of the Face-
book groups by categorizing the different posts according to their function. In line with cur-
rent research on the topic, the article concludes that social media facilitate new ways for 
citizens to organize disaster response efforts, and that in Dresden, this was most evident in 
terms of such a ‘switchboard function’ that social media provided for citizens. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In early June 2013, continuous weeks of rain over Central Europe caused severe 
floods in the major river catchments of the Elbe and Danube rivers. Widespread 
civil engagement to participate in flood response activities emerged across the re-
gion. Flood events in the region are not new, nor are citizen-driven flood response 
efforts. What made this event stand out from past events, was how social media 
platforms was used in the coordination of volunteer response activities. 
 On June 2, a young man named Daniel Neumann started a Facebook group 
called Fluthilfe Dresden (Flood Help Dresden) as the Elbe River was about to flood 
parts of the city. At first, Daniel did not think the group would attract much atten-
tion. But by the end of the first day, the group had 12.000 followers. By the end of 
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the third day of the emergency, the group peaked at over 50.000 followers. Sud-
denly he found himself posting messages on Facebook that guided thousands of 
people to where help was needed. With the help of such Facebook groups, as well 
as interactive Google Maps and Twitter tags, citizens shared information about the 
floods and organized response and preparedness activities. After the floods receded, 
the lesson has been, that social media has changed something profoundly about 
flood response Dresden. 
This article contributes to growing interest in how social media platforms and 
digital technologies are put to use by citizens, state entities, NGOs, and international 
organizations in crisis, emergency and disaster response (Alexander, 2014; Crowe, 
2012; Hughes and Tapia 2015; Meier, 2015; Starbird and Palen 2011). As much of 
this research has shown, social media platforms and other digital technologies are 
beginning to change how ordinary people coordinate and organize collective re-
sponse efforts to counter the threat of natural hazards.  
The article examines the Dresden 2013 floods case as an example of how social 
media technologies are changing not only how information is circulated in disasters, 
but also how citizens organize and carry out disaster emergency response activities. 
The article thus attempts to make a contribution in relation to the existing literature 
on social media and disasters, by examining how online activity relates to activity 
‘on the ground’. It does so by combining an ethnographic perspective of volunteer 
activity with a case study analysis of online activity on a Facebook group during 
the Dresden floods. The article focuses on one key function of the Facebook group, 
in which the group acted as a switchboard that connected flood victims and volun-
teers. The research question that the article thus seeks to answer is how can such 
online groups and networks do to enhance citizen-driven response efforts? 
The article is structured as follows. First, a short overview of the relevant re-
search on social media and self-organized response in disasters is presented. This 
is followed by a section that explains the methodology. In the next section, re-
sponses to the 2013 floods in Dresden are analyzed by focusing on how citizens 
organized response efforts with the aid of social media platforms. Then follows a 
section that analyses the patterns of user activity on the already mentioned 
Facebook group called Fluthilfe Dresden. The article concludes by discussing the 
key findings from the article in relation broader trends in the research literature. 
 
 
2. Social Media and Emergent Disaster Response 
 
In recent years, we have witnessed a substantial proliferation in the way social me-
dia, crowdsourced platforms, and digital mapping technologies are used in emer-
gencies. Services such as ‘Google Person Finder’ and ‘Facebook Safety Check’ 
have helped people locate missing family members (Tabuchi, 2011). Disaster relief 
operations also benefit from donations channelled through social media and text-
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messaging services (Lobb et al., 2012). Social media platforms can also as Hjorth 
et, al. (2011) provide new arenas for psychological support and affective cultures 
to arise following crises and catastrophes. Social media can enhance public aware-
ness when emergencies escalate, as information spreads through online social net-
works at a more rapid pace and in a more dynamic manner than through traditional 
media platforms, targeting a broader range of social groups, especially younger age 
groups (Veil et al., 2011:112; Vultee and Vultee, 2011). Yet there are also concerns 
that the multiplication of information flows risks more inaccurate and false infor-
mation being spread (Alexander 2014:725). 
 More generally, we can say that the rise of social media is transforming the 
roles of various actors in disaster response and relief, especially the roles of ‘ordi-
nary people’ or non-affiliated volunteers), who are most often seen by authorities 
and professionals as either victims, bystanders or onlookers in disaster situations, 
thus being excluded from response plans and policies (Scanlon et al., 2014). How-
ever, the long-standing research tradition on emergent behaviour in disasters 
(Dynes 1970; Fritz and Williams 1957; Rodriguez et al. 2006) makes it clear that 
citizens in most cases will volunteer to fill sandbags for contingency floodwalls or 
shelter homeless flood victims regardless of whether or not this is facilitated 
through social media. As a consequence, the impact of social media in emergent 
self-organized response should be weighed against the regularity at which this phe-
nomenon occurs. The argument proposed in this article is rather that social media 
platforms can thus reshape how affiliated, non-affiliated and first-responder move-
ments are formed, organized, and how they dynamically evolve over the course of 
an emergency. 
  Although disaster scholar David Alexander remarks in a recent comprehen-
sive review, that the current research literature on social media use in disasters and 
emergencies “is still quite limited” (2014:719), the field is rapidly growing, and are 
reporting on events from Haiti, to California, and to Japan (Stirratt 2011; Sutton et 
al. 2008; Yates and Paquette 2011). Researchers that study the topic come from 
different disciplines, and employ different theoretical frameworks and methodolog-
ical approaches. A dominant approach has been that of crisis informatics, that, as 
Hughes and Tapia explain, looks at “the information flows and exchanges surround-
ing crisis events” and how such new forms of communication “affect the social 
structures, processes, and interactions that underlie them. (2015:681). Much of this 
research focuses on what Starbird and Palen (2011) call “the information space” or 
in “microblogging environments”. In other words, networks and spaces that operate 
in the virtual realm. 
 This article does not focus on trans-local digital volunteer networks, that are 
often based on crowdsourcing, microblogging, or micromapping environments. 
Nor does it focus on the kind of digital humanitarian institutions and organizations 
that are beginning to emerge and become consolidated actors, such as the Digital 
Humanitarian Network, which connects groups and networks that deal with digital 
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crisis communication and information management. Rather, the focus is here on 
emergent digital networks and groups that are, firstly, locally oriented, and second, 
do not develop and form into stabilized and consolidated institutions, but are only 
active when an emergency presents itself. The focus moreover is directed at the 
transformation that happens between online activity and concrete response work 
‘on the ground’, that is, ‘in the physical world’. 
One of the main challenges in how to incorporate citizen-driven initiatives 
into more formalized and official response structures, however, is that that there is 
a gap between weak management structures that have a strong citizen participation, 
and a strong management structures that in turn have a lesser degree of citizen in-
volvement (Boersma et al., 2014:1). Importantly, as David Alexander notes, calls 
for collaborative emergency efforts will elicit stronger responses on social media 
driven by citizens themselves (Alexander, 2014:721), and, it could be argued, in 
ways that any government-driven coordination efforts on social media could not 
copy or mimic. This is perhaps due to the fact that these networks are able to create 
a mode of interaction where citizens respond sympathetically to other citizens be-
cause there is a sense of common purpose and unity, not least in opposition to gov-
ernment authorities.  
 In a recent outline of the problems involved in putting social media to use in 
emergencies, Hughes and Tapia have argued for a turn to studying the spaces in-
between digital volunteers and professional responders (2015:682), that also focus 
on the role of administrators of online platforms as mediators between wide scale 
public participation in emergencies, and professional agencies. This article follows 
the line of inquiry, asking what kinds of functions such groups can have as inter-
faces that mediate a specific demand and supply between those that need help, and 
those that offer it. It does so by paying attention to the translation processes that 
occur between social media administrators, online users and volunteers, and the 
relationship that such online groups have with professional responders. 
   
 
3. Methodology 
 
The article is divided into two analytical sections that draw upon different bodies 
of empirical data material. The first section describes what occurred during the 
floods, and examines the different discussions that have surfaced in their wake re-
garding what role social media ought to have during future events. This part draws 
upon data material from an ethnographic fieldwork conducted from 2014 to 2016 
in Dresden, as part of the author’s doctoral research. The data consists of field notes 
taken during public events, local meetings, and everyday encounters with residents 
of Dresden. This is supported by around 35 formal semi-structured interviews with 
flood affected citizens, flood response volunteers, shop owners, as well as with rep-
resentatives from government entities, NGOs, community associations, grassroots 
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initiatives, and administrators of social media platforms. The interviews had a du-
ration of between one and three hours. Recorded interviews were transcribed and 
translated from German into English. All field notes and interviews have subse-
quently been coded in Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis software.  
 The second section of the analysis examines the previously mentioned Face-
book group Fluthilfe Dresden in detail. Building upon the context provided in the 
first analytical section, this section examines the patterns, mechanics, and dynamics 
of volunteer online activity during the flood event. For this analysis, a mixed quan-
titative-qualitative methodological approach was used. All the posts made on the 
group’s Facebook page between June 2 and June 9 were plotted into a spreadsheet. 
These dates were chosen as the period of the emergency response phase before the 
recovery and reconstruction phases commenced. All posts were then listed chrono-
logically according to date and time, and the number of likes, comments, and shares 
that each post received were noted down. Finally, the posts were sorted into five 
different categories that were formulated inductively, i.e. based on the post data 
itself: 1) networking posts, 2) reporting posts, 3) supplying posts, 4) requesting 
posts, and 5) building posts. The different categories were then compared in relation 
to total number, likes, comments, and shares. Further details on the methodological 
considerations and functions of each post category will be presented later in the 
article.  
 In the following, an overview of the emergent civil response activities during 
the 2013 floods in Dresden through social media based on the author’s ethnographic 
research will be unfolded. 
 
 
4. Social Media and the Dresden Floods 
 
Dresden is a riverine city, founded and built along the banks of the Elbe. For cen-
turies, the city has experienced regular flood events when heavy rain in the catch-
ment region has resulted in inundation from the Elbe and its tributary rivers 
(Fügner, 1995). Floods are an intrinsic part of Dresden’s history. However, the so-
cial awareness of flood risk, however, suffered a generational memory gap as no 
major flood event occurred in the Dresden area between 1941 and 2002, which 
meant that generations of Dresdners had never experienced first-hand, what a 
flooded Elbe River looked like when the record-breaking 2002 floods engulfed 
many parts the city, and large parts of Central Europe. The impact was massive. 
Much of the structural protection measures had not been properly maintained or 
upgraded to fend off the water masses. Many people, moreover, had not prepared 
their individual houses for a likely flood event either, which resulted in the flooding 
of homes and widespread damages to property. But the flood response efforts were 
also extensive. Today, the event is remembered as a period of immense solidarity 
and altruism, as citizens from all over the country converged on Dresden and other 
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cities along the Elbe and Danube rivers who had been inundated by the floods. Such 
was the case again in 2013 when the Elbe almost reached the same level as in 2002.  
The 2002 event was much larger and more damaging, not least because the 
city’s structural defenses were in poor shape. When the Elbe River threatened the 
city again in 2013, both the structural defenses and the collective social awareness 
of the citizens made the event less disastrous. One of the major differences in the 
way the response efforts were carried out, however, was that during the June 2013 
floods, the citizens of Dresden self-organized through social media platforms in 
anticipation of the flood risk posed by the Elbe.  
It is important to stress that emergent response activities during floods are not 
a new phenomenon in Dresden. It has not taken the invention of social media for 
citizens to take an active part in responding to floods by either building provisionary 
sandbag dikes, providing shelter flood victims or bringing food to other volunteers. 
Yet the digital revolution has made a significant difference in how people have ex-
perienced the 2002 and 2013 events differently. As a study by Kaufhold and Reuter 
(2016) also reveals, the use of social media during the 2013 floods was widespread 
across Germany, and different forms of participation and crowdsourcing emerged 
on both Twitter, Facebook, and Google Maps. 
By exchanging pictures and eyewitness accounts on Facebook group pages, 
citizens actively participated in the management of the emergency. Locals did not 
only share information, but, importantly, also used the information to locate which 
areas needed help: filling sandbags, building contingency floodwalls, and preparing 
food for victims and other volunteers. This was done through the Facebook groups, 
whereby the administrators of the groups took the role of mediators, that as Hughes 
and Tapia note, can facilitate communication and collaboration, and can be effec-
tive in “advancing conversation and thought around how digital volunteers can fit 
with emergency response practice” (Hughes and Tapia 2015:691) In this process, 
the Facebook groups acted as mediating filters that directed the information and 
chose which information to post that was being fed to the group. This, of course, 
gave the administrators some degree of power to decide which posts ought to be 
forwarded and which should not, but it also focused the efforts, and in some respects 
came to resemble a more professionalized form of chain-of-command execution.  
From very early on in the flood emergency, Daniel Neumann received mes-
sages from on-the-ground eyewitness accounts, what is often referred to as ‘citizen 
journalists’, and posted updates about which areas needed help on the Fluthilfe 
Dresden page, and also forwarded requests from locals impacted by the floods. 
Daniel and his team would then direct people towards these areas, and they would 
also inform people about what kind of help was needed (e.g. sand, bags, transpor-
tation, food, shelter, etc.). By turning to the posts on Facebook groups, people who 
wanted to help could then orient themselves about the current situation, and get a 
sense of where help was in excess or in demand. Local companies and shops also 
7 
 
provided resources such as food and drinks for the helpers and posted their offers 
through the Facebook groups.  
 In other words, the Facebook groups functioned as switchboards (as in the 
function of a telephone switchboard) for receiving and directing information be-
tween those that needed help and those that wanted to help, while also being the 
main center for individual citizens, businesses, and even the authorities, to show 
support for the flood response efforts. In this sense, the social media activity was 
about much more than just a way of connecting and linking people. The networks 
also facilitated a space for solidarity to be expressed, where showing sympathy with 
flood victims and other volunteers became a central function of the networks.  
Some reports describe the gathering of large numbers of volunteers taking on 
an almost carnivalesque character, which is observed in many other instances of 
disasters (Solnit, 2009). In a few places, improvised bars, food stalls sprung up. 
Scenes of people passing around everything from chocolate to cigarettes suddenly 
became part of the event. People worked and hung out on the dikes, passing sand-
bags and drinks on to each other at a steady pace. Some news reports described an 
almost euphoric atmosphere in the parks and public spaces along the Elbe (Die Zeit, 
2013). The looming disaster emergency had turned into a social spectacle. All of 
these activities helped to turn the flood response into a matter of much more than 
merely response, but also a celebration of the unity of civil society. This was am-
plified through the Facebook groups, and, as will be discussed in the next section 
of this article, this function or effect of the social media platforms was probably the 
most significant reason why they have become the subject of a public debate in 
Dresden in the wake of the floods.    
 The citizen-driven response efforts that were, in part, mediated and organized 
through social media platforms both complemented and challenged the professional 
emergency efforts. In some places, citizens had organized response efforts before 
the government entities and professional agencies had arrived. The large number of 
volunteers to some extent enhanced the speed of filling sandbags, and citizens also 
used their own trucks and cars to transport sand and bags to the temporary filling 
stations that were set up along the Elbe. Volunteers also arranged for sand and sand-
bags to be transported to areas that had not received help from official channels. In 
other cases, there were more people than the response efforts could facilitate, and 
many that offered to help were asked to leave by the authorities. Some volunteers 
have reported that they felt redundant in their attempt to help, while others would 
spend a great deal of time moving up and down the Elbe in search of somewhere 
where help was in demand.    
 In a few cases, the large convergence of citizen-volunteers resulted in some 
poor decisions and problematic solutions. The most well-known example of where 
the self-organized civilian initiatives got it wrong was at a section of the Leipziger 
Strasse, a major urban road on the north-eastern side of the Elbe. When people had 
started to place sandbags along the river, they had also placed a great deal on top of 
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the permanent floodwalls where there was supposed to be fitted mobile steel-plate 
extensions on top. The volunteers did not know this, and the 10.000 sandbags they 
had placed on top of the wall would have had to be moved again, which the fire 
department did not eventually do, because it would have taken too much time. 
 Local authorities and responsible government agencies are now concerned 
that the future management and orchestration of flood response no longer lie solely 
in their hands. The Dresden Fire Department sees the massive mobilization of vol-
unteers, in part guided through online networks, as a being indicative of dilettantism 
and an Erlebniskultur (‘a culture of spectacle’). Citizens, on the other hand, have 
been highly critical of the authorities’ ability to act efficiently and quickly, and the 
purpose of one Facebook group that emerged after the floods was to discuss how 
the professional agencies failed. Social media administrators have also criticized 
the local government for not being receptive of the newfound role that online net-
works have gotten (Grigutsch, 2013).  
 As a result, the issue has turned into an ongoing public debate taking place in 
Dresden, concerning what the role of volunteers and social media platforms ought 
to be in future flood events. Further insights into discussions about the governance 
of flood emergencies in Dresden can be found elsewhere (Albris, forthcoming; 
Kuhlicke et al., 2015). 
   
 
5. The Switchboard Function 
 
This section looks more closely at the Facebook group Fluthilfe Dresden. As stated, 
the rapid increase in followers from a handful of people to over 50.000 in just a 
couple of days took Daniel Neumann completely by surprise. In this interview ex-
cerpt, he explains what happened once the Facebook group started to attract atten-
tion: 
 
“I was contacted by a local student club from the university who was interested 
in helping, and things really picked up speed from then on. By Wednesday 
night it peaked, and we reached around 50.000 followers. I was amazed. It was 
a true ‘Flächenbrand’ [i.e. it went viral]. In those days, I only slept for two 
hours per night. By Monday evening and onwards, I was receiving about 60 
personal Facebook messages and e-mails per minute. It was crazy. I got two of 
my friends to help me because it was too much to handle. Most of the people 
who started writing were offering help because they felt they needed to do 
something. So they offered food, clothes, anything to help. But this quickly 
became impossible for us to respond to. So I decided that we would only an-
swer those who requested help, not those who offered it. The bread must find 
the people, and that was what the Facebook page could do. We connected peo-
ple who needed help with those who offered.” (From interview fieldnotes) 
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Daniel’s group was able to tap into a natural desire for members of the public to 
offer their help. Other Facebook sites also emerged and became as popular as 
Fluthilfe Dresden, including Hochwasser Dresden (High Water Dresden) and 
Elbpegelstand (Elbe Level). But Fluthilfe Dresden has become a public symbol of 
the impact of digital volunteerism in the flood response in Dresden, and Daniel has 
appeared in several news articles and interviews (Der Spiegel, 2013; Grigutsch, 
2013). In general, the local media in Dresden and the national media of Germany 
have been highly interested in understanding the phenomenon of what one journal-
ist labeled “flood response 2.0” (Obergassner, 2013).  
This section takes a closer look at the posts on the group’s wall and compares 
them in order to analyze what the different functions of the network were during 
the emergency response phase. They can be divided into five categories according 
to their intended function: networking, reporting, supplying, requesting and build-
ing. The focus in this analysis lies in understanding how the group functioned as a 
switchboard for forwarding messages coming from the group’s followers. All mes-
sages appearing on the Fluthilfe Dresden wall are posted by the site administrators, 
but many of these are links from posts on other Facebook sites, or from other web 
pages, and the majority are messages that the administrators received from follow-
ers and posted on the wall.  
A total of 298 posts on the Fluthilfe Dresden wall from the period 2 – 9 June 
2013, when the flood emergency was most urgent, were plotted into a spreadsheet.1 
Data about the number of likes, comments, and shares that each post received was 
then inserted into the spreadsheet. Table 1 provides an overview of the five different 
post type categories, and the number of likes, comments, and shares that each cate-
gory received in total. In addition, an average for each posts number of likes, com-
ments, and shares in each category was calculated. Likes are interpreted as being 
indicative of the number of people supporting a post in a non-committing sense, 
while comments indicate a desire to engage and participate in a call for a request 
for help or a discussion. Shares indicate a willingness to expand the reach of the 
post because the person sharing it feels it should be seen by other people in his or 
her network. The analysis of these three forms of activity reveals which posts re-
ceived more or less attention, and thus indicates what the group was used for, and 
what made it popular among Dresdners. 
 
Table 1. Post types on the Fluthilfe Dresden Facebook Group, and the number of likes, comments, 
and shares for each post type.  
 
Post type Primary function 
Total 
posts 
Activity Likes Comments Shares 
Networking 
Extending and expand-
ing the reach of the net-
work 
14 
Total 764 151 994 
Average 55 11 71 
10 
 
Reporting 
Forwarding official and 
unofficial situational 
emergency information 
34 
Total 3458 451 2665 
Average 102 13 78 
Supplying 
Actors offering to sup-
ply their help through 
group mediators 
82 
Total 9462 546 3226 
Average 115 7 39 
Requesting 
Citizens requesting help 
through group media-
tors  
122 
Total 4506 2446 6801 
Average 37 20 56 
Building 
Building a sense of 
unity and common pur-
pose. 
46 
Total 70670 3124 14619 
Average 1536 68 318 
 
The first category, networking posts (N=14), covers those posts that encourage 
followers to share either the entire site or specific posts, within their own networks. 
The intended function of these posts is to build up the network. Logically, many of 
these posts were circulated at the beginning of the emergency, as the Elbe had not 
yet reached its peak level. 
The second category, reporting posts (N=34), provide information on the situ-
ation of the floods either through eyewitness accounts, government information, or 
links to news stories by the media. 
The third category is supplying posts (N=82). These cover messages forwarded 
by the Fluthilfe Dresden administrators from citizens, companies or institutions of-
fering to supply their help, food, resources, shelter, or other things in demand. This 
category encompasses information being fed to the group administrators and then 
forwarded so people requesting or needing help could respond. As the emergency 
developed, Daniel and his team began to change practice, and started forwarding 
fewer of these offers by people who wanted to help.  
Instead, they increased the number of what is here called requesting posts 
(N=122). These posts made by the group administrators instructed people where 
help was needed, what kind of help was needed, and in some cases how to contact 
those who had requested and called for help through the Fluthilfe Dresden site. 
These posts increased in number as the emergency progressed. This category en-
compasses information about where help was needed, and posting it so people of-
fering help could respond. For example, a local in the area of Cossebaude would 
write to the adminstrators that help was needed to fill sandbags in that area, and 
then the post on the group’s wall would make it possible for people to see where 
they could go to help. 
The fifth and final post type is called building posts (N=46). This category 
covers posts with pictures praising the work of volunteers, and in some cases the 
authorities, by offering feedback about the progress of volunteer work and results 
that the response efforts had achieved. These posts were often written with highly 
affective language, typical phrasings being: “Thanks to all volunteers – you are 
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amazing!”, “Dresden shows the world how it should be done””, or “Show the Elbe 
who is the boss!”. 
The data shows that networking posts received relatively few likes and com-
ments on average, but more shares than requesting and supplying posts because 
these posts asked people to spread the word of the group itself. Reporting posts 
received a high number of both likes and shares, and a substantial part of these posts 
(15 out of 34) were messages by different government entities, forwarded by the 
Fluthilfe Dresden administrators. However, Daniel and his team gradually tried to 
refrain from using the group to forward too much official information from either 
local government entities or other actors, and they have subsequently discussed 
with the administrators of another Facebook group, Elbpegelstand, that the division 
of labour could potentially be that this other group handles information updates, 
while Fluthilfe Dresden handles coordination of volunteers, but it remains to be 
seen how such a scenario would develop. 
The data also shows that supplying posts and requesting posts make up the 
majority of the activity on the group's wall (68%). As already noted, in the 
beginning, the majority of posts were supplying, but very early on, Daniel and his 
team changed strategy and chose to focus more on the requesting posts, which be-
came the most posted category in total. Requesting posts received far more com-
ments than supplying posts, indicative of the fact that when the group administrators 
posted a message of where help was needed, people would ask follow-up questions 
about what exactly was needed, and would respond in the affirmative if they in-
tended to respond. However, supplying posts received more likes on average than 
requesting posts, indicating that people responded sympathetically when someone 
offered to help. 
This tendency to respond positively to signs of solidarity, is most apparent in 
the final category, building posts. This category received by far the highest amount 
of both likes, comments, and shares on average. This is also the category in which 
posts sometimes went viral, i.e. that they became hugely popular and were shared 
widely beyond the network that followed Fluthilfe Dresden. The most shared post 
being was that of a man in a wheelchair filling sandbags, which was shared a total 
of 8.557 times. All the Facebook groups that emerged during the floods were filled 
with comments by users praising the collective effort by the public in countering 
the disaster, mirroring the social spectacle that the event also took on the ground in 
Dresden. The communities of solidarity that arise during disasters events and are 
formed through online networks also involve people who are potentially far away 
from the actual disaster context, but who none the less contribute to a public ex-
pression of solidarity with those that have suffered from a disaster event. An im-
portant observation to make in connection to this, is that these kinds of posts was 
what made the groups so popular, and not necessarily supplying or requesting posts, 
that had a more concrete function in the collective response efforts.  
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The analysis of this particular Facebook group is not meant to be representative 
of how such social media networks function in disasters. However, the activities 
that occurred on this particular Facebook page, does have similarities with other 
groups that emerged in Dresden, and ones that have emerged in other contexts 
(Kaufhold and Reuter 2015). 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the case study from Dresden supports the existing research literature 
by suggesting that we are witnessing a transformation in how ordinary people and 
professional emergency managers coordinate emergency response efforts in the 
digital age. Social media platforms enable actors to cooperate and organize emer-
gency response activities more rapidly and across traditional structures of emer-
gency response. This, in itself, is not new (Alexander 2014; Hughes and Tapia 
2015), but the case of responses to the Dresden floods, suggests that through switch-
board mechanisms as have been described, social media platforms can help distrib-
ute the supply of converging volunteer help that is often in excess during emergen-
cies. In this way, there is a practical potential for networks on for instance Facebook 
groups, to become a mediating actor for the now old problem of integrating ‘ordi-
nary people’ into emergency plans (Scanlon et al. 2014). 
Although, as the case study from Dresden also suggests, there is some degree 
of political antagonism and blame game following flood events, it is also evident 
that there were a lot of cooperation between state actors and citizens, both on-the-
ground and in online sphere. In several cases, the social media networks were used 
to forward and share posts and messages from the Dresden Fire Department, the 
THW, and the municipal administration. Recently, the local government in Dresden 
has stated its intents to create an official social media platform that will facilitate 
citizen involvement during future flood emergencies (Brüggemann, 2016), but it 
remains to be seen what this platform entails concretely, and whether it will seek to 
include citizen-driven social media groups, with administrators acting as mediators 
between citizens and professional responders. It is clear, however, that public in-
formation officials involved in communicating with the public (Hughes and Palen 
2012), will, also in the case of Dresden, have to change their roles to accommodate 
the fact, that self-organized citizen-driven initiatives will undoubtedly emerge on 
social media platforms in the future again. 
The findings from this case study suggest that there are indeed potentials for 
incorporating emergent digital networks into emergency plans, but that there needs 
to be a stronger involvement and recognition of administrators of for instance Fa-
cebook groups on the part of local governments. Moreover, it requires authorities 
to take seriously that a sense of common purpose, unity, solidarity is driving forces 
behind people’s engagement in responding to collective threats. On the other hand, 
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it also requires those people who have emerged as central to emergent online net-
works, namely administrators, to engage with government agencies and entities, 
which for Dresden, at least, seems to be the case in future flood events.  
Emergent responses from citizens are likely to occur during most disasters, 
and in this sense, social media platforms could be a binding link between govern-
ment entities and citizens if there is a willingness on both sides. An exploration of 
the challenges associated with the rise of social media in emergencies, their conse-
quences, and possible advantages and problems, lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
More research that addresses these and related issues will undoubtedly surface in 
the coming years as disaster response continues to feel the impact of the digital 
revolution. A persistent focus on how emergent groups and activities are mediated 
and orchestrated through social media and digital technologies needs to be at the 
center of such research, rather than seeing social media only as a medium for shar-
ing and circulating information. This article has sought to demonstrate that new 
forms of media can indeed have a far greater impact on disaster response.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The data from the Facebook group was manually plotted into an Excel spreadsheet in the 
summer of 2016. As a substantial time had passed the time of the flood in June 2013, the number 
of likes, comments and shares that posts received have been changed due to shifts in the com-
position of followers. However, the changes have been minor, and for the present purposes, the 
data material being analyzed is representative for the group activities during the floods. The 
Fluthilfe Dresden group is a publicly open Facebook group. 
 
 
References 
 
Alexander, D. (2014), ‘Social Media in Disaster Risk Reduction and Crisis Man-
agement’, Science Engineering Ethics, Volume 20, pp. 717-733. 
 
Bankoff, G. (2004), ‘Time Is of the Essence: Disasters, Vulnerability, and History’, 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Volume 22, Number 3, 
pp. 23-42.  
 
Bardo, John. (1978), Organization response to Disaster: A Typology of Adaptation 
and Change, Mass Emergencies, Volume 3, pp. 87-104. 
 
Boersma, F.K., Ferguson, J.E., Groenewegen, P., and Wolbers, J.J. (2014), ’Beyond 
the myth of control: Toward network switching in disaster management’, In S.R. 
Hiltz, M.S. Pfaff, L. Plotnick, and P.C. Shih, (eds), Proceedings of the 11th Inter-
national ISCRAM Conference, pp. 123-127.  
14 
 
 
Brüggemann, D. (2016), ‘Dresden bei Facebook und Twitter in Alarmbereitschaft’, 
MOPO24, 29 April. 
https://mopo24.de/nachrichten/dresden-facebook-twitter-alarmbereitschaft-67758 
(accessed 31 August 2016). 
 
Crowe, A. (2012), Disasters 2.0: The application of social media systems for mod-
ern emergency management, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
 
Drabek, T.E., and McEntire D.A. (2003), ‘Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology 
of Disaster: Lessons, Trends, and Opportunities from the Research Literature’, Dis-
aster Prevention and Management, Volume 12, Number 2, pp. 97-112. 
 
Dufty, N. (2012), ‘Using social media to build community disaster resilience’, Aus-
tralian Journal of Emergency Management, Volume 27, Number 1, pp. 40–45. 
 
Dynes, R.R. (1970), Organized Behavior in Disaster, Lexington, MA: Heath Lex-
ington Books. 
 
Fritz, C.E., and Williams, H.B., (1957), “The Human Being in Disasters: A Re-
search Perspective.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, Volume 309, pp. 42-51. 
 
Fügner, D. (1995), Hochwasserkatastrophen in Sachsen, Tauchaer Verlag, Taucha. 
 
Grigutsch, H. (2013), ‘Gute Ideen und Widersprüche: Initiatoren von “Fluthilfe 
Dresden” tun sich schwer mit der Kooperation’, Dresden Neueste Nachrichten On-
line, 14 June,  
http://www.dnn.de/Dresden/Lokales/Gute-Ideen-und-Widersprueche-Initiatoren-
von-Fluthilfe-Dresden-tun-sich-schwer-mit-der-Kooperation (accessed 31 August 
2016). 
 
Hjorth, L., and Kim, K.H.Y. (2011), ‘The mourning after: A case study of social 
media in the 3.11 earthquake disaster in Japan’, Television and New Media, Volume 
12, Issue 6, pp. 552–559. 
 
Hughes, A. L., and Palen, L. (2012). The evolving role of the public information 
officer: An examination of social media in emergency management, Journal of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Volume 9, Issue 1.  
Hughes, A. L. And Tapia, A. H. (2015), Social Media in Crisis: When Profes-
sional Responders Meet Digital Volunteers, Journal of Homeland Security and 
15 
 
Emergency Management, Volume 12, Issue 3, pp. 679-706. 
Kaufhold, M., and Reuter, C. (2016), ‘The Self-Organization of Digital Volunteers 
across Social Media: The Case of the 2013 European Floods in Germany’, Home-
land Security & Emergency Management, Volume 13, Number 1, pp. 137–166 
 
Kendra, J.M., and Wachtendorf, T. (2003), Creativity in Emergency Response after 
the World Trade Center Attack. Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-Dis-
aster Research, Special Publication #39 Natural Hazards Research and Applica-
tions Information Center, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO. 
 
Kuhlicke, C., Callsen, I., and Begg, C. (2015), ‘Reputational risks and participation 
in flood risk management and the public debate about the 2013 floods in Germany’, 
Environmental Science and Policy, Volume 55, pp. 318-325. 
 
Lobb, A., Mock, N., & Hutchinson, P. L. (2012), ‘Traditional and social media 
coverage and charitable giving following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti’, Prehospital 
and Disaster Medicine, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp. 319–324. 
 
Meier, P. (2015), Digital Humanitarians: How Big Data is Changing the Face of 
Humanitarian Response, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL. 
 
Obergassner, P. (2013), ‘Fluthilfe 2.0’, Stuttgarter Zeitung, 13 June, 
http://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.hochwasser-in-sozialen-medien-fluthilfe-
20.840e2039-1d61-4f12-833a-224e8ed5ad39.html (accessed 31 August 2016). 
 
Rodriquez, H., Trainor, J. and Quarantelli, E.L. (2006), ‘Rising to the Challenges 
of a Catastrophe: The Emergent and Prosocial Behaviour Following Hurricane 
Katrina’. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Volume 604, pp. 82-101. 
 
Scanlon, J., Helsloot, I., and Groendaal, J. (2014), ‘Putting it All Together: Inte-
grating Ordinary People into Emergency Response’, International Journal of Mass 
Emergencies and Disasters, Volume 31, Issue 1, pp. 43-63. 
 
Solnit, R. (2009), A Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities that 
Arise in Disaster, Viking, New York, NY. 
 
Stirratt, A. A. (2011). Social media use in March 2011 Japanese crisis: Impact on 
emergency preparedness advocacy. Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana: 
Master of Public Health Dissertation.  
Sutton, J., Palen, L., & Shklovski, I. (2008). Backchannels on the front lines: 
16 
 
Emergent uses of social media in the 2007 southern California wildfires. In F. 
Fiedrich & B. Van de Walle (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth International IS-
CRAM Conference, Washington, DC, May 2008, pp. 1–9.  
Der Spiegel (2013), ‘Fluthelfer über Facebook gesucht’, Der Spiegel, 4 June.  
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/hochwasser-hilfe-ueber-facebook-twitter-
und-webseiten-a-903706.html (accessed 31 August 2016). 
 
Starbird, K., and Palen, L. (2011), “Voluntweeters”: Self-organizing by Digital 
Volunteers in Times of Crisis. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human 
Factors in Computing Systems, New York, NY, USA: ACM, pp. 1071–1080. 
 
Tabuchi, H. (2011), ‘Quick Action Helps Google Win Friends in Japan’, New York 
Times, 11 July,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/11/technology/quick-action-helps-google-win-
friends-in-japan.html?_r=0 (accessed 31 August 2016). 
 
Veil, S. R., T. Buehner, and M. J. Palenchar. (2011), ‘A Work-In-Process Literature 
Review: Incorporating Social Media in Risk and Crisis Communication’, Journal 
of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 19, Number 2, pp. 110-122. 
 
Vultee, F. and Vultee, D.M. (2011), ‘What We Tweet About When We Tweet 
About Disasters: The Nature and Sources of Microblog Comments During Emer-
gencies’, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Volume 29, 
Number 3, pp. 221-242. 
 
Yates, D. and Paquette, S. (2011), ‘Emergency knowledge management and social 
media technologies: A case study of the 2010 Haitian earthquake’, International 
Journal of Information Management, Volume 31, Number 1, pp. 6–13. 
 
Die Zeit (2013), ‘Hochwasser in Dresden: Partystimmung beim Sandsacksleppen’, 
Die Zeit, 6 June.  
http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2013-06/dresden-hochwasser-face-
book (accessed 31 August 2016). 
 
 
